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 Abstract 
States are organizations of governance that apply to the people living in a defined territory. 
But in order to sustain such governance, the people must not just individually obey the law, 
but also colletively conceive of themselves as “We, the People..”, with whom the law 
originates. For only if I, the individual citizen, have reasons to trust that, they, my fellow 
citizens, are actually willing to also obey the law, I’ll do so myself. This indispensible sense of 
belonging to a civic community can be based upon a variety of factors: ethno-cultural, 
linguistic, civic republican (as in “constitutional patriotism”) or social justice. Applying this 
notion of an indispensible civic infrastructure to the case of European integration, the author 
discusses a number of potential sources from which the view might be derived that what 
happens in Europe is a matter of “us, the Europeans”. In the absence of a democratic regime 
in Europe, as well as a European welfare state (to say nothing about a strictly “European 
culture”), it is not easy to find out possible foundations of European “identity”. 
Zusammenfassung 
Staaten sind nicht nur “vertikale” Organisationen politischer Herrschaft. Vielmehr basiert die 
staatliche Herrschaftsordnung auf Strukturen der Binnenintegration (“Vergemeinschaftung”), 
die über alle Konflikte und Besonderheiten hinweg das horizontale Verhältnis der Bürger 
zueinander bestimmen. Diese Binnenintegration muss nicht “ethnischer”, sondern kann sehr 
wohl republikanischer Natur sein und dann als sozialintegrative Voraussetzung für 
Demokratie und Wohlfahrtsstaat dienen. Wenn das zutrifft, stellt sich die Frage nach dem 
möglichen Modus politischer Integration im europäischen Maßstab. Gibt es Traditionen, 
Identitäten und Zielbestimmungen (“finalité”), die zwischen allen Europäern Vertrauen und 
Solidarität begründen können? Der Verfasser prüft die in Betracht kommenden Antworten 
auf diese Frage und kommt zu dem skeptischen Ergebnis, dass die sozialmoralischen 
Grundlagen einer europaweiten Demokratie und eines kontinentalen Wohlfahrtsregimes 
keineswegs evident sind. 
  
Bemerkungen 
Hier können allgemeine Bemerkungen eingefügt werden. Falls das nicht gemacht wird, muß hier eine 
leere Seite stehen (damit das Inhaltsverzeichnis auf einer ungeraden Seite beginnt). 
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Everywhere, one reads the same thing: the European Union is a political construct sui 
generis – no (longer) a confederation, not (yet) a federal state, but a “would-be polity”. It is 
an accurate but not very useful observation. If this definition “by process of elimination” were 
to have real informative value, it would include a clear accounting of the structural 
differences that set the EU apart from the more familiar form of political rule, the nation-state. 
We would then have a tool with which to assess the EU’s functional capabilities, and in 
particular, its ability to organize society’s exercise of power over itself as legitimately and 
efficiently as does the nation-state. 
Accordingly, the first part of this chapter will be devoted to a consideration of how the internal 
relations of the EU contrast with those of a nation-state republic. This is followed in the 
second part by a review of the practical, political motives that have driven the process of 
integration thus far, and which in turn are shaped by that process. The aim here is an 
assessment of the EU’s political efficiency. The chapter concludes with an examination of the 
prospects for the development of a mode of European integration that enhances the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy. Special attention is paid to the sceptical assumption that, on the way 
to “Europe”, political resources (understood as society’s ability to exercise control over its 
own quality and development through the means of governance) will be lost rather than 
gained. 
1. The Internal Relations of a Nation-State Republic 
Constitutional states differ from authoritarian and absolutist states in that political power in 
the former is not only exercised through law, but also established and limited, beforehand, by 
way of a special law – namely, the constitution. Thus, in a constitutional state, the body 
through which the state exercises its power is not just an empirical fact or a factual system of 
interactions, but a formal, judicial fact vested with normative validity. Before the governing 
agency becomes active and expresses itself in concrete acts, it is already present as a 
normatively constituted fact, as something that “should-be” – i.e., as a normative description 
of the governing body’s method of operation, its jurisdiction and the limitations thereon. 
The act of establishing a constitution not only sets the modalities and limits of the (future) 
use of power, but also reflects upon the author of the constitution. The establishment of the 
constitution must be conceived as an act in which the constituent member, the “people”, 
forms itself and at the same time submits itself to the constitution. “The full sense of the term 
constitution implies ... that it can be traced back to an act which the citizens put into place, or 
which is at least attributed to them, and in which they provide themselves with the political 
ability to take action”.1 In this respect, the act of establishing a constitution implies not only 
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 Dieter Grimm, Braucht Europa eine Verfassung? (München: Carl Friedrich von Siemens-Stiftung, 1994), 
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that a legal, ordered and limited authority of the state exists, but also that a political 
community of the “people” exists. This political community is created when a “people” 
submits itself to a political order of its own invention, in the process gaining an identity both 
within itself and towards the outside world. 
Thus, in the act of establishing a constitution, the “people” ceases to be a mere ethnic fact – 
i.e., a multitude of persons made distinct through their origin and common culture – and 
starts to become a demos – i.e., understood as the subject-object of a deliberately founded 
governing body. And yet, between “ethnos” (as the embodiment of an exclusive linguistic, 
religious, cultural, etc. community of origin) and “demos” (as the ethnically neutralized 
instance of the legitimation of state power), there is also continuity. Working as a catalyst, 
“the national self-image builds the cultural context in which subjects could become politically 
active citizens. It is only the sense of belonging to a ‘nation’ that establishes an interrelation 
of solidarity between persons who up to that point had been strangers to one another. ... The 
nation or the spirit of the people ... supplies the judicially constituted state with a cultural 
substratum”.2  
The foundation of a political community by an act of will is not a chance occurrence. Rather, 
it is the product of dispositions that Max Weber has characterized as “a belief in 
commonality” (Gemeinsamkeitsglauben) or “feelings of belonging to a community” 
(Gemeinsamkeitsgefühle); these dispositions “are nothing definite and can be fed by very 
different sources”.3 Despite the vagueness with which Weber outlines this empirical anchor 
of an act of will imposing set duties, it seems clear that in the case of the nation-state, the 
things believed or felt to be in common would be of a spatial or temporal nature. In other 
words, the self-recognition of a people as a demos has an empirical frame of reference, 
which encompasses a (usually undivided) territory settled together and a history understood 
as “concerning all of us”. It is a fund of positive and negative traditions and historical 
protagonists, whose appropriation makes up the factual “particularity” of those who 
reciprocally recognize each other in normative terms as belonging to the same demos. 
Above all, the self-recognition of a people as a demos is grounded in the nation’s history, 
which functions as a reference point for the establishment of a constitution in both positive 
(as a source of examples and traditions) and negative ways (as is often the case with post-
totalitarian constitutions). 
The historical-geographic grounding of the societal and governmental contract, which is 
completed uno actu with the establishment of the constitution, not only is a contingent 
condition for the formation of this two-sided contract, but also may be a necessary condition 
for its continued existence. The importance of the historical or temporal aspect is 
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3
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demonstrated by settler societies such as the United States, where citizens’ explicit memory 
of their common descent from far-flung ancestors becomes a basis for strengthening the 
willingness to practice inter-ethnic tolerance, or by societies where moral catastrophes 
remembered as part of a national history provide the foundation for the concretization of a 
constitutional consensus based on civil rights. 
The geographic or spatial dimension of the determination of a political community centres on 
the role well-established (i.e., recognized by both sides) borders play in delineating the 
state’s territory. National borders help integrate the people into the state’s constitutional 
political order by minimizing conflicts over the area in which the order of law is valid as it 
pertains to individuals; that is, they guard against the emergence of a legal grey zone on the 
periphery, or a political claim to represent external ethnic minorities. Set territorial borders 
are also a reference point for the formation of a “people”, as the crisis in south-eastern 
Europe demonstrates. They serve this function by limiting the authority of the state to its 
spatially determined “area of validity” and preventing it from taking on a political “obligation to 
care for the welfare of persons” who may be “our” ethnic “brothers and sisters”, but are not 
by virtue of being also our “co-citizens”. And, territorial borders are essential for maintaining 
public welfare within states. They permit the political community to ensure that scarce 
resources are conserved for internal use and to stave off the intrusion of unwelcome outside 
influences. Borders are not barriers, but rather filters or membranes, which can be 
selectively opened from within – for example, to stimulate exports or control the flow of 
migration. They are the “decision points” at which the balance of positive and negative influx 
and outflux can be registered and controlled.4 
Thus, the separate recognition of a common history and its meaning and the shared 
recognition of a territory and its inhabitants are together the indispensable catalysts for the 
materialization of a political community. Conversely, sharp “historical-political” polarization is 
just as decisive a barrier on the way to the formation of a political community (or “republic”) 
as are discrimination against internal minorities or care for the welfare of people outside the 
borders of the political community. 
Geography and history are not the end of the story, however. The political community of a 
demos is also defined by a third dimension – a duly constituted authority of state.5 This 
authority manifests itself by imposing duties on citizens within the limits of basic rights and 
demanding the fulfilment of these duties within the framework of the state’s monopoly on the 
use of force. In addition to the obligation to obey the law generally, there are three such civic 
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5
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Häring. 
4 — Claus Offe / The Democratic Welfare State — I H S 
duties: compulsory school attendance, compulsory military service (or the duty of 
professional military personnel to accept risks to life and limb caused by politics), and the 
obligation to pay taxes. Civic duties entail a loss of freedom for the individual, who must yield 
this freedom without the certainty that he will earn any benefit in return. In this respect, civic 
duties are informed by a principle similar to that of “non-affectation” known from budgetary 
law – i.e., fulfilling one’s duties does not create any right to a corresponding service. Rather, 
it is an offering “to all”, the burden of which, under certain circumstances, is made lighter by 
the certainty that “all others” are likewise disposed towards fulfilling their duties, or can be 
forced to do so. 
The double restriction civic duties place on freedom of action is illustrated by comparing 
them with a simple purchase. Purchases are the result of a two-tiered decision, made freely. 
In the first step, the buyer decides how much money he would like to spend (instead of, say, 
denating it or saving it); in the second step, he decides which goods he would like to obtain 
for the money spent. With civic duties, both of these freedoms are annulled. For example, 
school-goers (legally represented by their parents) have neither the freedom to refuse to 
attend school, nor the right to determine the curriculum. Instead, curricula – like state 
budgetary expenditures or military defense obligations – are decided upon politically by the 
institutions and office-holders of the three areas of state authority entrusted with those 
responsibilities. The individual citizen is thereby integrated into a compulsory association of 
cultural, defense, national, budgetary, and legal communities. Although, “all” citizens 
ultimately determine the content and purpose of this association through the processes of 
democratic legitimation and political accountability, they perform this function not as 
individuals, but as constituent members of a political community. 
This account of civic duties is not intended to provide fodder for neo-liberal attacks on the 
“vampire state”, but rather to introduce two propositions. Vertically, the efficiency of a state’s 
actions requires that citizens fulfill their duties automatically, or at least that the state be able 
to secure their compliance with minimal use of its resources of coercion. That which is 
expected of the individual citizen is nothing less than the feat of taking part “obediently” in an 
organization of rule that compels him to be a member of a cultural, economic and defense 
community at the cost of some of his freedom, some of his possessions, and in some cases, 
his life. Horizontally, the fulfilment of civic duties depends upon every “duty-bound” citizen 
thinking of the collective author of his normative duties (i.e., the state, which is established 
by a democratic political process) and thus of “all other citizens” (who participated in that 
process) as capable of sufficient reason and goodwill to accept these duties as legitimate 
and binding. 
In order for a citizen to recognize a duty as legitimate and binding and thus to fulfil it 
“voluntarily”, rather than as a calculated avoidance of punishment or in deference to tradition, 
he must hold two robust and resilient fundamental beliefs about “everyone else”. First, he 
must have enough faith in the integrity of his co-citizens that he perceives no reason not to 
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perform his civic duties; “he himself” must assume that “all others” will fulfil the same duties. 
Second, a citizen must believe that his own compliance is important even when it does not 
bring him any direct personal benefit, but rather redounds to the advantage of others, whose 
welfare is one of his “external” preferences. The first of these beliefs is passive and can be 
defined as trust (or the absence of fear). It can be strengthened through a constitutional and 
legal order, which in guaranteeing basic rights, limits the power of the collective to make 
decisions affecting the individual, but it cannot be established this way. The second is an 
active belief and is called solidarity (or the absence of indifference); it, too, cannot be forced 
on people formally, but rather merely encouraged through state social services and the 
redistribution of wealth.6 
The “horizontal” phenomena of trust and solidarity (linking citizens to each other) are 
preconditions for the “vertical” phenomenon of the establishment and continued existence of 
state authority, manifested in effectively ensuring the performance of civic duties. In simple 
terms, this means that before citizens can recognize the authority of the state, they must first 
mutually recognize each other as being motivated by – and hence reciprocally worthy of – 
trust and solidarity. It is precisely when this abstract but resilient trust in “everyone else” as 
the collective co-author of the obligating norms is undermined, or when citizens’ active 
interest in each other’s well-being is successfully discredited that liberal notions about 
curtailing the scope of the state’s authority flourish. Trust in one’s fellow citizens provides the 
cognitive and moral foundations for democracy, the risks of which no one would reasonably 
accept otherwise.7 The solidarity citizens feel toward one another, or to which they allow 
themselves to be obligated through their representative institutions, is the moral basis of the 
welfare state. Thus, both democracy and the welfare state are dependent upon the prior 
existence of binding motives, which in turn are tied to the form of political integration found in 
the nation-state. 
The special ability to place citizens under obligation, which arises from their affiliation with a 
national political community, is, of itself, nothing mysterious. Belonging to a “people” is 
essentially a status right. This right can be conferred upon someone (through naturalization), 
but it cannot be obtained contractually (say, through purchase) – just as children do not 
become family members through contracts (except for in the case of adoption). Because 
nationality is not contingent upon a contract, it is a remarkably “fixed” status. Unlike 
companies or even states, nations are a form of societal organization that can neither be 
“founded” nor go into liquidation. Their origin loses itself in the mists of the past (which is 
also the birthplace of founding myths), and they are perceived to exist “forever”. 
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For those who belong to the special social construct “nation” (to which, in this respect, only 
the social group “family” corresponds), the defining features of membership – i.e., “affiliation 
as a status right” and the “fiction of permanence” – make it relatively easy to engage in risky 
interactions such as a demonstration of trust or solidarity. Expressions of trust are made 
safer by the common national culture, the improbability of migration and the ability to impose 
sanctions in cases of defection. Demonstrations of solidarity are less risky because the 
exchange relation is understood as unlimited in its temporal extension; the duties each 
citizen performs need not be re-payed directly to that citizen, but rather can be passed down 
from one generation to the next in a never-ending chain. Following the conceptual model of 
the generational contract in social retirement insurance and the principle of what Kenneth 
Boulding called “serial reciprocity”, no member of a nation is ever in danger of being the 
“last” one (and hence the “sucker”, in game theoretic parlance) who contributed without 
being able to claim the right to services in return. Like the family on the micro-level, the 
nation on the macro-level constitutes an unusually favourable structural and interpretive 
framework for “assurance games” – i.e., cooperative solutions that reproduce themselves 
and for which functional equivalents are not easily located above or below the national level. 
The idea of a totality of persons, integrated through relations of trust and solidarity and 
extending beyond family and tribal affiliations, though not to the extent of being “limitless” in 
space, appears to be a necessary condition for democracy. The universe of citizens who 
achieve their collective self-recognition in this manner has its outer borders in the nation and 
its “people”. The people, not as an ethnic affiliation by origin and culture, but as a political 
community, self-constituted in reference to history and territory and made distinct by its 
willingness to demonstrate trust and solidarity8, is an indispensable conceptual building block 
of political analysis. It is the social sub-stratum of the polity, which produces a legally 
formalized constitutional order and strengthens that order through its ability to integrate. 
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2. Motives for Surmounting the Limits of the 
Nation-State and the Dilemmas they Raise 
Although the nation-state generates the relations of trust and solidarity upon which 
democracy and the welfare state depend, it is structurally a sub-optimal formation. The 
nation-state is economically sub-optimal because it restricts the mobility of consumer and 
capital goods at its borders, making it less efficient than a common market, which provides 
for the comparatively unlimited exchange of all goods and services under uniform conditions. 
It is politically sub-optimal because it tends to priorize narrowly-defined national interests 
over transnational problems, even to the point of accepting the collective harm of military 
force. The rational solution would be to transfer political responsibilities from national to, say, 
European governmental authorities, particularly in the areas of foreign affairs, security, law 
and monetary policy. However, if this argument appears compelling on the surface, attempts 
to put it into practice quickly run up against a fundamental fact of social life: It can be 
perfectly rational for actors to choose non-cooperative tactical moves that manifestly violate 
long-term, global optimization criteria if these moves maximize their utility under given “local” 
opportunity and incentive structures. Actors will be particularly inclined to do this when they 
perceive that other actors, upon whose cooperation global success is dependent, are caught 
in the same dilemma. Global-rational solutions are impeded even further if there is an 
uneven distribution of either the sacrifices or the expected profits of cooperation. Clearly, 
then, what is needed is a rational method of resolving conflicts between local and global 
efficiency, or short-term and long-term efficiency. 
Because of the lack of clear normative-analytical standards, political science research on 
Europe has largely avoided identifying “rational” ways to create institutions, and instead has 
limited itself to offering explanatory reconstructions of dilemmas and the paths actors have 
followed in attempting to overcome them. These paths are characterized by antithetical 
idealized concepts such as “negative” vs. “positive” integration,9 or “contract” vs. 
“constitution”.10 National governments are typically seen as responding to the Common 
Market’s neutralization of their economic sovereignty by seeking to preserve their political 
sovereignty, yielding it only through voluntary and revocable contractual agreements. 
Without any formalization of the players, themes and processes, and in the absence of any 
authorization from a central governmental power, an involuntary process of negotiation 
begins. This process pushes on at random, arrested or accelerated by changing 
environmental conditions, and shaped by a functionalistic logic of emergent problems, “spill-
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 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States”, in: 
Governance in the European Union, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, 
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over” effects, problem-solving, and consensus-building.11 The idea that consistently 
emerges, from both “realist” and “functional” interpretations of transnational processes of 
integration, is that the interdependencies between relevant governmental and non-
governmental protagonists are noted and cumulatively included in cooperative 
arrangements; however, this process is not itself embedded in political institutions, nor is it 
politically steered. 
The conceptual alternatives that dominate the social science debate on Europe are clearly 
divided and are indicated by the conceptual pairings “inter-governmental voluntarism” vs. 
“neo-federalism” or “supranationalism”. The two alternatives refer to different dynamics of 
integration. “Inter-governmental voluntarism” describes a functionalist dynamic driven by 
national and sectoral interests or contractual compromise, wherein progress is made through 
cooperative tactical moves that cumulatively fulfil emergent functional necessities. “Neo-
federalism” and “supranationalism” both refer to a dynamic that envisages the intentional 
establishment of a political order for all of Europe, oriented towards the fulfilment of shared 
values and standards – i.e., a federalist state order. This latter perspective can be described 
as “intentionalist”.12 The difference between “negative” and “positive” integration corresponds 
to the distinction drawn between inter-governmental voluntarism and supranationalism. 
Negative integration is understood here as the elimination of tariff and other barriers to trade 
and capital mobility sanctioned by decision of the European Commission, and, when 
necessary, the European Court of Justice. Positive integration refers to the emergence of a 
uniform, EU-wide system for the regulation of economic, trade and social relations, and 
presupposes a corresponding development of political will in the Council of Ministers. 
In a system of economically interdependent but politically independent nation-states, there 
are two principal problems of cooperation, which give rise to mutually exclusive solutions. 
The first problem occurs when national governments act uni-laterally or inter-governmentally 
in a manner that threatens other players with negative externalities. Behaviour of this sort 
can be eliminated only by reducing the scope of the nation-state’s discretionary authority. 
One way of achieving this would be through a higher-ranking, Euro-federal “governing 
capacity”, based on positive integration and the principle of subsidiarity, which had the power 
to limit the exercise of national sovereignty to truely “internal” affairs – i.e., affairs whose 
regulation would not create negative externalities. Another approach would be to foster an 
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understanding that a strong, formally constituted European executive is the only entity 
capable of counteracting the homogenizing forces of the market. In both cases, however, a 
marked expansion of “positive” integration is clearly required, not just in the areas of foreign, 
domestic and judicial policy, but also for labour market and social policies. 
This leads to the second problem of cooperation. Consent to a “strong” governmental form 
arouses the opposite fear among a significant number of member states – namely, that a 
potent European “governing capacity”, based on majority decisions and not hamstrung by 
voluntary adherence, could render individual member states defenseless against the political 
agendas of the dominant players. The most typical scenario is one in which the national 
preference of the majority in individual member states is drowned out as a minority position 
within Europe. At the core of this fear is a sense of the impending loss of the democratic 
nation-state’s “autonomy in shaping its own will” (Autonomie der Willensbildung).13 This 
leads to a rational preference for a negative form of integration, which maximizes the political 
jurisdiction of the nation-state. 
In assessing the relative merits of negative and positive integration, it is important to 
recognize that the former can be just as damaging to the socio-economic order as the latter 
is to national autonomy. In the case of purely negative integration, the threat is to the social 
welfare system, which nation-states are able to maintain only by virtue of having control over 
their own labour market, social, monetary and economic policies. In the case of purely 
positive integration, it is the nation-state’s established mechanisms for democratic 
legitimation that are imperilled; these mechanisms cannot be reproduced at the European 
level because Europe lacks the inner structures of a “nation” as described above. The choice 
is thus between the plague of negative externalities caused by voluntarism and the cholera 
of political determination by European institutions against whose claim to sovereignty nation-
states cannot muster any democratic remedy. Rather than confront the implications of this 
choice directly, each national government imagines that it lives in the best of all possible 
worlds – one in which all others governments are bound by the chains of a European 
government, but it is free to make policy in harmony with national majority preferences.14 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
13
 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Demokratische Politik in Europa”, in Zur Neuordnung der Europäischen Union: Die 
Regierungskonferenz 1996/1997, Dieter Grimm et al., eds. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996/1997), p. 65.  
14
 There are certain conditions under which it may be rational for nation-states to cede their sovereignty to 
supranational institutions. Marks et al. (1995: 9f.) identify two such situations. First, an advantage of cooperation (for 
example, reduced transaction costs) may come into effect earlier than the disadvantage associated with 
relinquishing sovereignty. Second, the transfer of decision-making rights to a higher level of government may enable 
governing elites to shift responsibility for the undesirable consequences of a decision to that level of government: “In 
some circumstances, responsibility for a particular decision is a power to be avoided rather than sought. This is true 
if any decision on a particular issue brings more costs than benefits”. Cf. Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit 
Blank, “European Integration Since the 1980s: State-Centric Versus Multi-Level Governance”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, (1996), p. 9ff. It is important to note, however, that both scenarios simply involve a trick, whereby 
problems of legitimation are deferred to a future date. 
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My thesis is that every provisional solution between the two extremes of full nation-state 
sovereignty and European supranationalism inevitably violates both reference values – i.e., 
protection of the social welfare system and democratic legitimation. The present approach to 
European integration thus would appear to represent a descent down the ladder that T. H. 
Marshall proposed as a model for the process of European political modernization.15 The 
three rungs of this ladder are liberal, democratic and social rights, achieved cumulatively. 
The question is whether in Europe today the social welfare and democratic levels are being 
passed in reverse, reducing Euro-citizens to the status of mere participants in a neo-liberal 
marketplace. 
The degree of integration achieved in Europe since the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
June 1997 bears out this thesis. It can be characterized as a state of suspension between 
the inter-governmental and supranational models. Economically, the EU functions as a 
confederation of states operating on an inter-governmental basis. The member states have 
created a unified, transnational economic realm through a contractual transfer of 
jurisdictions. Economic and criminal justice authority has already been ceded to Brussels, 
and the surrender of national currencies and monetary autonomy is imminent. However, this 
confederation of states joined by treaties is not so much a legally irreversible entity as a 
practically irreversible one. The parties to the contract perceive no real option of terminating 
it because such a move would trigger built-in economic sanctions of a compelling deterrent 
value, and this makes it difficult to speak unambiguously of inter-governmental voluntarism. 
On the other hand, there can also be no talk of a perfected European federal state. That 
would require a constitution establishing a balance of legitimation such that the European 
citizens exercised democratic control directly (and not through their national governments) 
over the representatives of European sovereignty (the Council, the Commission and the 
Court). Instead, the nation-state remains an indispensable intermediary in European politics. 
Such European civic duties as exist can be executed only indirectly, through nation-state 
administrations; actions can be taken on the European stage only on the basis of nation-
state empowerment of European authorities; and legal orders (“directives”) of the European 
Commission develop legally binding effectiveness (if they are not already limited to the 
status of “recommendations”) only after their adoption by national legislative bodies. The 
European executive does not have the capacity to levy taxes, implement defense measures, 
enact effective orders of law, or take charge of public education.16 As for the EU’s legislative 
powers, its two representative bodies, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, 
are hamstrung in their efforts to generate legally binding European civic duties by 
exceptionally rigid procedural rules. Even the so-called “acquis communitaire” – i.e., the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
15
 T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964).  
16
 And nation-states show no signs of being willing to transfer this authority. For while the members of a nation-
state generally concede to their fellow citizens the right to impose normative duties according to jointly created 
constitutional and legislative procedural principles, and attribute to them the moral and cognitive competence to do 
so, they typically extend this recognition only to co-nationals!  
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massive store of norms of secondary European law – has limited binding effect. It already 
allows members to opt out of regulations in the interests of a “variable geometry”, and it will 
be undermined further by the special provisions that are certain to accompany the EU’s 
expansion eastward. 
In short, Europe today is in a muddle. National governments are the bearers of democratic 
legitimacy, but the transfer of authority that has accompanied the implementation of the 
Common Market has reduced their power to shape the prospects and safeguard the 
interests of their national populations. More and more, this role is being played by the 
European Court and the Commission. However, they act largely in accordance with the logic 
of “negative” integration, because, without a base of political legitimacy of their own, they 
lack the mandate (and the resources, for that matter) to spearhead the development of new 
political initiatives. The European Council cannot transfer this mandate to the Commission 
and the Court, because its members, who act on behalf of national electorates and are 
responsible to these electorates, currently lack the potential in trust or solidarity to furnish 
“positive” integration programs with a political and fiscal basis. Thus, there is a disjunction 
between the ability and the mandate to act; the former is already largely in the hands of the 
European institutions, but the latter still resides with the national governments. Together, 
these mirror-image deficits threaten to demolish both the democratic and the social welfare 
state achievements of the modern European nation-state. 
There are two alternatives for addressing the democratic deficit in Europe: a transfer of the 
ability to act (“governing capacity”) back to the nation-state, or a “transfer forward” of 
democratically-backed mandates to act to European representatives of governmental power. 
The first alternative is represented by the call for “subsidiarity” – i.e., for the preservation of 
domains in which the nation-state is sovereign (for instance, in the areas of labour market 
and employment policies). The evidence to date, however, suggests that this avenue offers 
little real hope. No matter how determinedly they endeavour to preserve their autonomy, 
national governments increasingly find their hand forced by the economic and fiscal 
imperatives of the Common Market, which seems inexorably to sweep national institutional 
structures for the development of programs of interest-mediation (such as those of “Rhenish 
capitalism”) into the vortex of market-driven “institutional arbitrage”. 
The second alternative – the transfer of legitimized mandates and action resources to 
supranational authorities – confronts the following question: Can the Council and the 
Commission acquire a positive identity in the eyes of European citizens and become the 
object of demands and expectations concerning a truly European-wide political agenda? The 
initial outlook on this score is not promising either. There has been a sharp rise in the 
negative politicization of European institutions since the beginning of the 1990s, owing 
largely to the strains the Common Market has placed on the institutional and regulatory-
political acquis nationale established in European countries during the post-war period. This 
acquis nationale has consisted not only in the installation of strong liberal democracies, but 
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also in the introduction of a wide range of policies of government intervention, which 
collectively make up the modern democratic welfare state. These policies vary across 
nations, but generally include measures to promote employment and modernization, social 
insurance agencies, tariff and political co-determination arrangements and other market-
limiting (“decommodifying”) agreements. Praised as a vehicle for fostering inner cohesion 
and the “institutionalization of class conflict” during the Cold War period, they are now seen 
as “locational disadvantages” in the new dynamic created by the Common Market, their 
survival threatened by competitive de-regulation, regressive taxation and a rollback of 
redistributive measures. European institutions have become negatively politicized in this 
process because they are perceived to have allowed this progressive dismantling of the 
democratic welfare state to proceed unchecked. In essence, the charge is that they have 
subjected the structures of the welfare state to an efficiency test without ensuring that 
equivalent institutional alternatives exist in the event that re-regulation is deemed necessary. 
Thus, as fears mount about the effects of monetary union on employment, social standards 
and monetary stability, European citizens continue to look to their national governments for a 
response. European institutions are not yet seen as having a valuable role to play in the 
search for a framework that will ensure equitable relations between states, regions and 
social classes. Part of the reason is a lack of vertical efficiency in European politics; 
European institutions simply do not have the ability – the political and fiscal “governing 
capacity” – to pursue such ambitious goals. But there is also a more serious horizontal 
deficiency. Europeans still think of themselves primarily in national terms; they have not yet 
developed the relations of trust and solidarity on the European level that would be necessary 
to underpin a stronger European governing capacity. Only when a more abstract and wider 
frame of reference for a “European people” has been adopted will the cultural and cognitive 
prerequisites for a positive politicization of European institutions be in place. 
Today in Europe, a “pouvoir constitué”, limited in its ability to govern and weak in 
legitimation, controls the scene without a corresponding “pouvoir constituant”. The only 
remedy for this situation is the development of a widespread predisposition towards a 
“European internationalism”. Ideally, European institutions themselves would help foster this 
horizontal dimension, but they can do so only as a political and cultural by-product of an 
increase in the vertical efficiency of European politics. The development of relations of trust 
and solidarity on the European level is contingent upon good governance, and this means 
that Europe’s first priority must be to establish a legitimate, transparent and effective 
European governmental authority, which cannot be “negatively” politicized as a kind of 
supranational foreign rule. Five means of supplying the institutional protagonists of the EU 
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with the legitimation and recognition necessary to cultivate a “common frame of political 
reference” at the level of the citizens have been identified.17 They are reviewed below: 
1. The most “economical” approach to surmounting Europe’s democratic deficit suggests that 
the legitimation problem will eventually resolve itself automatically. This argument is 
premised on the technocratic belief that, by placing limits on its own authority, demonstrating 
knowledgeable competence and ensuring the impartiality of its executive decisions, the 
Commission could earn itself sufficient political credit with the European public to make 
further formal legitimation unnecessary. In light of the increasingly negative politicization of 
the EU and its agencies, however, it now seems indisputable that this strategy was sufficient, 
at best, for an initial phase of “negative” integration during which the work of the Commission 
could still be presented as a pure “coordination game” – i.e., as a process with an incidence 
of advantages that was universal and even.18 
2. The second approach, which dates back to 1979, calls for transforming the EU into a 
parliamentary system through direct elections to the European Parliament (EP). This 
proposal is as unworkable today as it was then, for several reasons. The EP’s role remains 
limited relative to that of the Commission, and there are no European parties, no coordinated 
system of franchise throughout Europe and, above all, no European public opinion 
connected by the media to train a critical eye on the EP’s activities. In its capacity as 
legislative assembly, the EP competes as a kind of second chamber not only with the 
Council, but also with the national parliaments. Its potential for political legitimation, as set 
out by the European Union Treaty, remains rudimentary, despite its right – which is restricted 
in terms of scope and time – to participate in decisions in relation to the Commission.19 
3. The third path to legitimation focuses on the Council of Ministers. This approach is flawed, 
however, because the Council’s members are the executives of the member states, not the 
representatives of a European legislature. Although the issues dealt with by the Council can 
be discussed and voted upon by the national parliaments, the latter’s cognitive resources are 
inferior to those of the Commission. The Commission simply “knows” more about the 
conditions necessary for successful transnational coordination and consensus-building in the 
Council, and this gives it has more influence over the Council than the national 
parliaments.20 A further problem with relying on the Council is that its activities, unlike those 
of the national parliaments, are usually scrutinized only by groups whose interests are 
directly affected, rather than evaluated in terms of their impact on the broader European 
public. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
17 Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., The European Union: How Democratic Is It? (London: Sage, 
1996).  
18
 W. Scharpf, “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State”, unpublished manuscript (Köln: Max 
Planck Institute, 1996), pp. 154–155. 
19 Keith Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of European Union 1973–1995 (London: Fontana, 
1995), pp. 340–364. 
20 Gary Marks et al., “European Integration Since the 1980s”, p. 22. 
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4. The fourth option for strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the EU is the expansion of 
the practice of qualified majority voting to the Council of Ministers. By cancelling the veto-
rights of individual (or smaller groups of) member states, or so the argument goes, it will no 
longer be possible for a minority of states to halt the decision-making process outright or 
manipulate it by extortionary means. However, it is questionable whether this proposal 
genuinely aims to enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making process, or simply to 
increase its speed and effectiveness. One obvious concern is that “the citizens of countries 
whose governments are outvoted have no reason to consider such decisions as having 
democratic legitimation”.21 
5. The fifth and final recommendation calls for strengthening the mechanisms of territorial 
representation (elections, parties, parliaments, governments), but also those of functional 
representation – i.e., through inter-organizational negotiations, or the endowment of 
corporatist collective actors with political representational functions. This strategy is 
predicated upon the existence of a system of corporatist (as opposed to pluralistic) 
organizations, representing the interests of employees, employers, financial institutions, of 
agriculture, etc., whose protagonists would have the capacity to “lobby” European institutions 
and build “responsible” compromises. The problem is that no such system currently exists on 
the European level today, nor is one likely to be created in the near future. Neither does the 
Economic and Social Committee come close to fulfilling these criteria, nor are Europe’s 
social partners (especially the unions) organizationally or politically equipped to play the 
same role on the European stage that they have played in the “corporatist” nation-states.22 
Furthermore, those organizations that are in a position to play this role (chiefly the sectoral 
industrial organizations) generally see “Euro-corporatism” as inimical to their interests, which 
they believe are better served by the unrestrained operation of markets. 
This examination of the dual criterion of the effectiveness and the legitimacy of governance 
yields the result that the EU presently lacks the qualities that would make it a “political 
community” expressed in the form of a state. In its present form, the EU is neither a unified 
organ of governance, nor one of democratic will. As for the demand voiced by some today 
that republicanism must manage without the support of the nation-state and “learn to stand 
on its own two feet”, it must be countered that an environment which would be conducive to 
such learning is simply missing.23 It is generally agreed that the two deficiencies, that of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
21 Scharpf, “Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States”, p. 26. 
22 Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe, pp. 386, 468, 487ff. and 598; Andersen and Eliassen, eds., The European 
Union: How Democratic Is It?” pp. 40–51, 251. 
23 Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, p. 142. This environment would be conducive to learning 
when the two requirements formulated by Habermas are met: “The citizens must also be able to experience the 
practical value of exercising their rights in the form of social security and reciprocal recognition of different cultural 
ways of life”. (p. 143, emphasis in original). However, the experience of “social security” is predicated upon the 
existence of a European governmental authority that has already made itself visible through its ability to act, while 
that of “reciprocal recognition” could result only from a legitimization process that addressed the fear that European 
dictates will demolish national institutions and “ways of life” (for example, the Swedish liquor sales and distribution 
system, or the German public broadcasting corporations). 
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legitimacy and that of effectiveness of governance, can only be remedied simultaneously. 
Strengthening the ability of European institutions to govern is not conceivable without an 
expansion of their formal democratic basis of legitimation. However, the EU will become the 
focus of the democratic will of an informed European public opinion only when it appears as 
a unified organ of governance, and this will require that national publics yield ground on 
subsidiarity and opting-out privileges in favour of greater acceptance of European policies. 
It is my contention that steps taken to surmount the European governmental and democratic 
deficits simultaneously must not be thought of according to the logic of a vegetative process 
of “ever closer” integration – i.e., as the result of actions based on rational interests. It 
“should be obvious that [the politics of integration are] not driven by a logic of ‘spill-over’ from 
international market integration to supranational state formation”.24 The logic of advantage is 
unsuitable as a vehicle for building a political community, because steps toward integration 
always appear, at least in the short term, as costs (e.g., a loss of protection, or a reduction in 
security) and thus carry with them the temptation to withdraw or block the initiatives of 
others. Furthermore, even if Economic and Monetary Union were to prove a positive-sum 
game, the anticipation of such a blessing would not engender any motivational thrust, for, as 
Jacques Delors used to say, “people do not fall in love with a common market”. Progress on 
the way to a unity of European intention and action will materialize only when national 
publics are presented with normatively convincing grounds for the desirability of a political 
integration – reasons they find sufficiently compelling to warrant their acceptance of the 
(temporary) disadvantages caused by the integration of states, regions, sectors and social 
classes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
24 Wolfgang Streeck, “Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?” in Governance in the European 
Union, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, eds. (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 
65 (emphasis in original). 
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3. Normative Arguments for European Integration 
Having determined the need for a more “intentionalist” (as opposed to functionalist) 
paradigm for European integration, we must now examine whether there exists an adequate 
supporting repertoire of European social norms in the name of which a process of integration 
can be promoted which cannot be promoted on the basis of a interest-driven logic of 
advantage alone. These norms must be potentially binding and they must have the 
motivating power to support the establishment of a federal European organ of governmental 
rule beyond all particularist and short-term calculations (and eventually in opposition to 
them).25 Our examination must also embrace the related question of whether there is such a 
thing as a European “identity” – i.e., a totality of binding and obligating traditions, which 
originate in European history, are unanimously accepted as valid by present-day Europeans 
and can orient and legitimize political action in the relations between European nation-states. 
I would suggest that the outlook is bleak on both fronts. 
Herfried Münkler has demonstrated that the term “Europe” lacks positive content and fails to 
provide practical convergent points for orienting activity.26 Rather, it is outward-looking and 
more in the nature of a “counter-term”. Historically, Europe has defined itself as a community 
of protection against the Ottoman, “Asian” and “Soviet” “East;” as an internally divided 
colonial community of “mother countries” in relation to the South; and, from time to time, as a 
culturally chauvinistic community of tradition set against the Anglo-Saxon West and its 
“civilization”. When one attempts to formulate a normatively substantive and non-idealistic 
definition of Europe as an entity in and of itself, however, the term immediately falls apart into 
groupings of nation-states, whose common history is remembered as one that divides more 
than binds.27 
The roots of these, at times, overlapping partial aggregates of Europe may run very deep 
and have impeded the development of binding notions of European citizenship and pan-
European social solidarity. Europeans generally do not view each other as possessing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
25 It is notable that insistence upon the intrinsic normative value of European integration and related efforts to 
downplay points of view based on national interests are peculiarities of the discourse of political and intellectual 
elites in Germany. Consequently, the objectives that inform this discourse are more “Euro-federal” than 
“intergovernmental”. Although strong arguments can be marshalled in favour of this one-dimensional vision of a 
Europe grounded in principles rather than interests, they remain vulnerable to two suspicions. Outside observers not 
unreasonably fear that this vision (1) merely expresses German uneasiness about persistent European fears of 
renewed German hegemony, or more seriously, (2) uses “post-national” motives as a smoke-screen to obscure a 
drive for dominance of a monetarily unified Europe by the German government (and its Bundesbank). 
26 Herfried Münkler, “Europa als politische Idee: Ideengeschichtliche Facetten des Europabegriffs und deren 
aktuelle Bedeutung”, Leviathan, vol. 19, no. 4 (1991), pp. 521–541. 
27 Think of the Latin-European Mediterranean states, the Greek-Orthodox countries, the Carolingian countries, the 
Hapsburg-succession states, the German-speaking countries, the British and French model cases of Western 
democracy, the British Isles, the Benelux, Scandinavia, the Baltic states, the Allies of WWII, the emerging 
democracies of central and eastern Europe, the four neutral countries not members of NATO, or the coastal states 
of the three European Seas and Oceans.  
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status of people “like ourselves;”28 this conception of a “family resemblance” (historically, 
economically, geographically, politically or however substantiated) is typically reserved for 
selected “neighbours” and generally is not extended to all Europeans. In reality, the term 
“European” is more a descriptive social-geographic category than a politically instructive 
category of common reflection and political will that could become a basis for self-
characterization, and this has disturbing implications for European integration. As Delanty 
writes, “European integration must recreate what exists on the level of the nation-state, but 
this is impossible because Europe is devoid of a cultural framework independent of the 
nation-state”.29 
Clearly, there is a need for principles that could transform European unification into a 
hegemonic idea, independent of the balance-sheet of positive and negative “pay-offs”, but 
the search for such principles has been held back by the absence of a clear conceptual 
starting point. If peace, human rights, democracy, and economic prosperity and its equitable 
distribution are the genuine European reference values, then the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
treaties are hardly documents that could feed a European constitutional patriotism based on 
these values (and in any case, the Commission lacks the jurisdiction, the will and the 
financial resources to turn the EU into such a bastion of social justice).30 As for EMU, the 
present focus of the integration process, it certainly will not furnish the moral and political 
motives for a political union of Europe. Instead, widespread fears about its impact on 
economic stability and employment have prompted a backlash, which makes it seem unlikely 
that a plebiscite on further integration would achieve a positive result.31 European political 
elites have endeavoured to combat this negative view of closer economic integration by 
appealing to the symbolic-expressive and moral principles of European identity, but to little 
avail. “The articulation of a symbolic discourse of Europeanness has ... had little impact (and 
even that has often been negative, notably in the anti-Muslim overtones of the idea of a 
“Christian” Europe), and the institutions designed to embody it (e.g., European citizenship as 
created by the Maastricht Treaty, or even direct elections to the European Parliament) have 
been highly marginal”.32 
There are also practical obstacles to the formulation of a strong normative argument in 
favour of European integration. Given the size of the EU today and the diversity of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
28 Nor do they view each other as possessing an unconditional right to assistance arising from a European sense 
of solidarity. When European are moved to altruism, they are far more likely to direct their charitable donations to 
Bangladesh than to the inhabitants of the Irish Northwest. 
29 Gerard Delanty, “Theories of Social Integration and the European Union: Rethinking Culture”, unpublished 
paper (University of Liverpool, 1996), p. 6. 
30 “EU social expenditure amounted in 1994 to 0.9 per cent of the welfare budget of the member states”. Richard 
Gomà, “The Social Dimension of the European Union: A New Type of Welfare System?” Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 3, no. 2 (1996), p. 222. 
31 ImmerfalI and Sobisch, “Europäische Integration und europäische Identität”. 
32 John Crowley, “European Integration: Sociological Process or Political Project?” Innovation, vol. 9, no. 2 (1996), 
p. 156. 
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economies and cultures it encompasses,33 it may be inevitable that attempts to transcend 
national particularities and achieve a symbolic-moral self-characterization of “Europe” lapse 
into abstraction. And as fiscal austerity measures undermine the EU’s capacity for structural, 
regional and agricultural support,34 and eastward expansion admits new members who will 
be net recipients of EU funds, it seems probable that what little good will the European public 
currently does bear the project of European integration will evaporate. This constellation of 
European values and nation-state interests is leading to the visible decay of the symbolic 
Gestalt of Europe and of the political-moral demands that can be plausibly attached to the 
EU.35 
In the worst case scenario, some observers have suggested that democracy – the 
quintessential European principle – will be damaged rather than strengthened by political 
integration. “The principle of democracy is validated in the member states; these, however, 
see their decision-making powers on the wane. The decision-making powers accrue to the 
European Community, where the principle of democracy is only weakly developed”.36 And as 
the discussion in part of strategies to enhance the legitimacy of the European institutions 
made clear, institutional reform by itself is an inadequate response to this problem. As 
Scharpf succinctly points out: “The democratic deficit cannot be reformed away”.37 Grimm 
contends that the EU’s democratic deficit is rooted in its multi-linguality and the obstacle this 
raises to the formation of a European public sühere capable of holding political parties and 
legislative institutions accountable in accordance with the standards of western European 
democracy.38 In the absence of a European “people”, the demand for accountability will have 
to be addressed within the framework of the nation-state, and since any attempt by the EU to 
approach a federal state in its structures and functions will weaken democratic principles, the 
EU’s legal basis must remain grounded in a contract under international law, not a European 
constitution.39 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
33 Presently, the EU is home to eleven languages, three large Christian and several non-Christian religious 
communities, growing geographic distance, vastly different member state experiences with Europe, and above all, 
disparities in economic development and productive capacity. For example, with respect to the last dimension, the 
ratio of the per capita production of Luxembourg and Greece in 1995 was 3 to 1. Cf. Richard Rose, What is Europe? 
A Dynamic Perspective (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 278. 
34 Michael J. Baun, An Imperfect Union (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 143.  
35 The preceding discussion demonstrates that the EU cannot be thought of as a construct analogous to a normal 
“state”. The reason is that the collapse of state socialism and its border with the West have raised questions about 
the limits of the European state and its “people” that have yet to be definitively answered in the manner required for 
a normal and proper state. 
36 Grimm, Braucht Europa eine Verfassung? p. 34. 
37 Scharpf, “Demokratische Politik in Europa”, p. 65. 
38 The standard of western European democracy should be thought of here in contrast to what O’Donnell terms 
the simple “electoralism” of Latin American “delegative democracy”. Cf., Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative 
Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, vol., 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 55–69. 
39 Habermas vehemently rejects this conclusion, even if with a few bold normative insinuations, in Die 
Einbeziehung des Anderen. And he is not alone in dissenting from this pessimistic view of the prospects for 
European integration. Thus, Sassoon thinks it imaginable, desirable and even imperative for the maintenance of the 
level of integration already achieved in Europe that the integration process be liberated from the shackles of the 
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Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that a repertoire of social norms capable of 
supporting a more “intentionalistic” paradigm of European integration does not currently 
exist. Moreover, interdependence and the division of labour will not automatically generate 
this trust and solidarity, any more than social integration, in the sense of the convergence of 
social norms and cognitive orientation, will flow naturally from the integration of national 
systems through trade and factors of mobility. The horizon of the Common Market created by 
the Unitary European Act of 1987 coincides with that of a European political society as an 
undivided community of will. If this society is to be brought into being, a different set of 
motives will be required, and its content will depend on how the political socialization of 
Europe is conceived. Five possible interpretations are considered below.  
Europe as a Guarantor of Peace – The political integration of Europe is to be desired (and 
the attendant economic costs and loss of national sovereignty to be accepted) because this 
would represent a definitive surmounting of the rivalries between European nation-states that 
led to this century’s most catastrophic military conflicts. In particular, it would ensure the 
integration into Europe of the country of origin of the two World Wars – namely, Germany – 
which is also the largest and potentially richest and most powerful EU member state, and 
which directly borders on more potentially threatened neighbouring countries than any other 
country in Europe. The attempt to cast Europe as a guarantor of peace is driven by the twin 
impulses of European fear of German dominance and German anxiety about this fear. 40 
However, “fear is no longer enough to drive European integration forward”.41 The 
experiences of the Second World War and the Nazi terror are fading into the past, and the 
prospect of a military confrontation between the stable democracies of the EU is now highly 
unlikely. International guarantees make state borders in Europe effectively inviolable, and in 
any case, states increasingly recognize that gaining access to others’ resources is more 
easily achieved through such peaceful means as trade and the movement of capital than 
through the use of military force. 
                                                                                                                                          
Common Market and informed instead by the objective of setting goals for a socio-politically secured “democratic 
union of citizens”. To this end, he proposes anchoring a normative minimum for the whole of Europe in a European 
Charta. This Charta would be more abstract than the acquis, and at the same time would democratize European 
legislation and strengthen the protection of basic and social rights in certain member states. Its purpose would be to 
make the political principles of a “European model of social capitalism” binding on all present and future members of 
the Union. Cf. Donald Sassoon, Social Democracy at the Heart of Europe (London: Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1996), p. 15. A similar call for the political-moral validity of a specifically “European project of modernity” 
combining an emphasis on productivity with political and institutional checks on the operation of the market is found 
in Brian Bercusson et al., Soziales Europa – ein Manifest (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1996), p. 18. 
40 EU member states are suspicious of the fact that Germany is the only EU member to express “a preference for 
supranational empowerment as a national goal”. Cf. Marks et al., “European Integration Since the 1980s”. Even 
w hen this preference is recognized as sincere and not suspected of being a “veil for other objectives”, distrust can 
be stirred by the anomaly of a nation-state which has misgivings about its own sovereignty and therefore seeks to 
abolish it. See also Andre Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1997) on this subject. 
41 Ian Buruma, New York Review of Books, October 17, 1996, p. 57. 
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Of course, the inviolability of existing borders is no guarantee against the far more likely 
danger that separatist civil wars will be fought over part of a nation-state’s territory (as in the 
case of Northern Ireland), possibly with a view to establishing new borders. However, it is 
difficult to see how the EU (including the West European Union and the EU´s “second pillar”, 
the Common Foreign and Defense Policy) could respond effectively to threats of this sort (cf. 
the example of Cyprus). On the contrary, the spectacular failure of European governments to 
take decisive action in Yugoslavia after 1991 has almost completely discredited the vision of 
the EU as a guarantor-authority of a European order of peace. In short, the EU serves a 
peace that is not threatened, but is positively powerless in the face of the much more 
immediate danger of subnational wars within individual EU member states and on the 
region’s periphery. 
Europe as a Bastion of Freedom – Since 1989, the antithesis of freedom and human rights 
against the “totalitarian” bloc of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon has no longer functioned as 
a political and motivational negative reference for Europe. Instead, the sudden liberation of 
the countries of central and eastern Europe has created a long waiting list of aspiring EU 
members, whom the existing member states can no longer demonize for their violations of 
human rights and their restriction of political and civic freedoms. On the other hand, the EU 
cannot refer to these candidates for membership in unambiguously positive terms either. 
Whether because of poor economic and political conditions or because of the lack of a 
strong civil society tradition, many of them fall far short of European standards with respect 
to their treatment of minorities, their human rights policies and their freedom of the media. In 
south-eastern Europe and the Baltics in particular, it is questionable as to whether the 
concept of freedom (no matter how vehemently it is being invoked in order to veto the 
access of Turkey to the EU) can truly play the role of a positive, normatively unifying bond 
defining “Europeanness”. Thus, “Europe” appears to have lost much of its moral contours.42 
Europe as a Singular Synthesis of Political Values and Principles – Europe can be idealized 
from a historical perspective as the place where the tension between the three components 
of political modernization – namely, equal rights of citizens, sovereignty of the people and 
social justice – was resolved theoretically, and on occasion, harmonized in practice. 
However, the institutional achievement of a “free and democratic social state” has given rise 
today to a contradiction. On the one hand, the realization of this “European” synthesis has 
been quite limited in Europe itself, occurring only under the favourable conditions of post-war 
prosperity in the third quarter of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the normative 
intention to bring about such a synthesis is no longer an exclusively European goal, but 
rather has become one of the hegemonic political ideas in the OECD world and beyond. 
Thus, whereas European universalism has, as an idea, virtually gone global, in Europe itself, 
as a practical demand, it has been disgraced in various ways. Today, it is Australia that 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
42 Tony Judt, Große Illusion Europa: Herausforderungen und Gefahren einer Idee (München: Hanser, 1996), pp. 
142–159. 
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arguably holds the honor of having achieved the most successful and lasting synthesis of the 
three principles of political modernization, while in Europe, liberals warn of the danger of a 
“new authoritarianism”, which threatens civic freedoms, rights of political participation and 
social security.43 
Present-day Europe can claim a monopoly on neither the idea nor the reality of freedom, 
democracy and the welfare state. If a sharp external distinction can be made between 
Europe and the rest of the world, it is a practical rather than a normative one, arising from 
the use of trade and immigration policy to construct a “fortress Europe”. The values and 
principles upon which modern Europe established itself have become, through a synthesis of 
the legacies of the Judeo-Christian, enlightenment liberal and socialist traditions, 
components of a virtually global shared common property. They are therefore not suitable (at 
least not without regression to a cultural and religious strategy of political confrontation of the 
sort foreseen by Huntington) as the distinctive legacy of Europe. Europe today is a motley 
collection of languages, cultures, religious denominations, historical traditions and nation-
bound understandings of sovereignty; and this heterogeneity will only become more 
pronounced as the EU expands eastward. Thus, one looks in vain for standards and 
principles that would be recognized as bindling everywhere in Europe and only in Europe.  
Europe as a Shared Cultural Space and Way of Life – It is often assumed that the expansion 
of the Common Market will make national borders motivationally and cognitively less 
relevant and lead to a greater homogeneity of lifestyles and consumption patterns. 
Transnational tourism, media broadcasts of sporting events, an opening of national-linguistic 
spheres of communication through the spread of foreign language skills, the dissemination 
across Europe of visual and acoustic (i.e., non-verbal) art and entertainment programs, and 
the extensive media coverage of European themes are all seen as means of creating a 
shared cultural space and way of life. Eventually, a new cognitive framework could emerge, 
which would protect local and regional traditions but at the same time be firmly grounded in a 
positive conception of a unified Europe. 
In the meantime, however, the reality is that “European” self-identification (other than in tiny 
Luxembourg, with its 29 per cent share of EU-foreigners in the residential population) 
remains a marginal phenomenon. “Only a small minority of de-jure Europeans think of 
themselves presently as ‘European’ in the psychological sense”, and “university trained 
people think of themselves as ‘European’ twice as often as persons with less formal 
education”.44 The European frame of reference is, therefore, that of a narrow segment of 
elites, while attitudes towards work and politics, religion, family and education still follow 
clear national patterns. As for political, educational and cultural programs aimed at shifting 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
43 Ralf Dahrendorf, “Die Quadratur des Kreises – Freiheit, Solidarität und Wohlstand”, Transit, vol. 12, pp. 5–28. 
44 Immerfall and Sobisch, “Europäische Integration und europäische Identität”, p. 33. 
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the focus of citizens’ world views from the national to the European level,45 they should be 
viewed with scepticism given the reservations Europeans already have about the progress of 
integration. 
Europe as an Economy of Scale in Political-Economic Terms – Combining the economic, 
political, technological, scientific and military resources of the (expanded) EU would create 
opportunities far surpassing those available to conventional economic “world powers”, 
among which would be the formation of an unprecedented political and societal problem-
solving potential. Less obvious is what sorts of problems would be recognized as meriting a 
“pooling of resources” (in contrast to the simple removal of barriers to the mobility of various 
resources) and a deployment of this formidable problem-solving capacity. The only 
Europeans with a definite claim on European funds are the candidate countries of central 
and eastern Europe. For them, the speed and direction of economic and political 
modernization are dependent upon whether and how soon they can partake, as full 
members, of the structural and agricultural funds. However, acute budgetary and labour 
market crises in many EU member states have reduced western European tolerance for 
transnational redistribution.46 Furthermore, the long-term contribution that central and 
eastern Europe could make to the EU’s collective resources (new markets, possibilities for 
investment, military security, control over migration) is much less evident than that expected 
from Spain and Portugal at the time of the EU’s expansion into southern Europe, in 1986. 
To complicate matters further, the European funds are not the only means of achieving the 
much-vaunted effects of synergy and economies of scale; these effects can also be realized 
below the level of the Commission, through bi-lateral and multi-lateral economic, scientific-
technical and military forms of cooperation. If the full economies of scale of European 
integration are to be realized, mutually agreed goals and projects will be necessary, to which 
EU members are sufficiently committed that they will accept the necessary short-term 
distributional sacrifices. Such goals and projects are currently in short supply, however. The 
problem would not be so serious if forms of “positive” integration existed, which could make 
the European “polity” into a vehicle for a Europe-wide social and employment pact. Instead, 
the opposite is the case, with the consequences of the present “negative” approach to 
integration – i.e., competitive deregulation of national employment and environmental 
protection standards and pressure to consolidate budgets – actively working against the 
development of a positive vision of integration. The sole remaining argument in favour of 
conceiving Europe as an economy of scale in political and economic terms is that the 
continent’s political integration as “fortress Europe” could ensure its protection from external 
competitors, chiefly in North America and the Far East. However, this is hardly a strong basis 
for a positive vision of European integration. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
45 Walter Hornstein and Gerd Mutz, Die europäische Einigung als gesellschaftlicher Prozeß (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1993), pp. 22, 249. 
46 For instance, it is clearly not feasible to extend the Common Agricultural Policy, as it is presently conceived, to a 
country such as Poland, where no less than 27 percent of all those employed work in the agricultural sector. 
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This seems to exhaust the repertoire of values and principles upon which the project of a 
political union of Europe could be based. None of the five interpretations considered above 
offers a clear path forward, but the analysis does reveal one important thing: the public’s 
need for a normatively convincing defense of European integration grows more pressing as 
the integration proceeds, and this is true for both internal and external reasons. At home, 
Europe confronts the rise of right-wing populist-nationalist sentiment, primarily in Austria, but 
also in Greece. This remains a localized phenomenon, but to the extent that it represents a 
backlash against the negative consequences of integration, it may intensify as those 
consequences become more apparent. Abroad, Europe faces a plethora of problems – 
involving climate, ecology, economic stability, development, migration, crime, the media, 
security and external affairs – that require concerted transnational action. In the face of these 
pressures, the functionalist approach to European integration, which suggests that the 
European project – at times haltingly, at times precipitously – will somehow, under the strain 
of existing interdependencies and emerging elite-consensus, will accomplsh itself quasi-
automatically, is revealed as increasingly barren. People would do well to remember that 
Europe provides a framework not just for cooperative problem-solving, but also for problem-
diffusion (cf. the discourses regarding BSE and “Schengen”, as well as the strains on 
redistribution created by the drive to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria). If the EU is 
to play the former role – if it is to mount a coherent defense against the disintegrating 
pressures of globalization and rejuvenate the scope for political action – it will first have to re-
constitute itself purposively as an effective and legitimate governing capacity. 
24 — Claus Offe / The Democratic Welfare State — I H S 
Conclusion 
I would like to conclude by shifting my focus from the normative motives for political 
integration to the social-moral consequences of integration. The optimistic view of Europe is 
that the European Union will steadily acquire greater legitimacy by virtue of its perceived 
accomplishments, a growing familiarity of European citizens, and a gradual institutional 
innovation. The democratic deficit, in other words, will wither away of its own accord. A less 
optimistic, but perhaps more realistic alternative can be summed up in the proposition that 
the horizons of trust and solidarity and the potential for creating a community on a civic-
societal and republican-political basis narrow as the frame of reference for relations of 
competition and interdependence widens. This “de-limitation” of functional interrelations is 
accompanied by a deliberate “de-commitment” on the part of individuals, groups, regions 
and whole states to the European collective. My argument is that when the borders of nation-
states become porous, the functional-systematic and the social-moral modes of integration 
develop in opposite directions. I submit that recent events in Northern Italy and the Federal 
Republic of Germany support this claim. Neither the “Padanian” fiscal policy secession 
efforts nor the proposal for a regionalization of the social security system that is so populat 
with some governments of the more prosperous German Länder can be explained without 
reference to the budgetary constraints and competitive conditions wrought by the Common 
Market. 
What should we infer from this? Historically, the largest social body capable of supporting 
redistributive sacrifices has been the nation-state. Thus, we should expect resistance to be 
all the greater when the demands of distribution are extended beyond that entity. Individuals 
begin to feel that excessive moral demands are being made of them, and they react by 
morally under-challenging themselves. As in Banfield’s model of “amoral familism”, they 
become vigilant lest someone outside their social circle profit from their contributions. This 
decline in the operative horizons of trust and obligation is caused by the opening of nation-
state borders, and it can be expected equally from “rich” and “poor:” from the former, 
because they will attempt, for rational reasons, to evade national and transnational demands 
on their resources; from the latter, because, as “policy takers” of regional and structural 
funds, they have a strong incentive to emphasize their subnational identity in their dealings 
with European authorities. These two strategies are obviously in a relation of reciprocal 
intensification. 
In the absence of co-extensive efforts to create a political community, “borderless” systems 
will often over-estimate their moral and legitimate power. In the process, they become 
breeding grounds for “postmodern” and neo-liberal tendencies, and jeopardize the 
dispositions and institutional arrangements that encourage individuals and governments to 
consider the social, temporal and practical long-term effects of their actions (and inaction). 
This suggests that the most important of these arrangements – the social welfare state and 
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democracy primarily, but also the corporatist system of comprehensive and “far-sighted” 
interest mediation – can be realized only “within borders”; that is, within a mode of 
socialization limited to the nation-state, whose protagonists recognize each other as worthy 
of trust and solidarity and who perceive each other as equal participants in a community of 
law, which is enduring and binding for all. By disregarding these connections and allowing 
the polity to be “de-limited” with impunity, we undermine its power to impose duties and open 
the door to regional and particularist motives, protagonists, and strategies. 
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